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Abstract
This paper constructs a dynamic game model to address the following groundwater man-
agement problem, where quantity and quality of the water are taken into account. A group
of farmers overexploits a groundwater stock and causes excessive pollution. A water agency
wishes to regulate the farmers' activity, in order to reach a minimum level of quantity and
quality but is subject to a budget constraint and can only use regulatory policies that do
not vary over time. The model takes into account the strategic interaction between farm-
ers and the hierarchical relationship between the water agency and the farmers. Regulated
and laisser-faire scenarios are compared. Results consist in a set of conditions under which
constant policies can bring the groundwater resource back to the desired states. In an ex-
ample, it is shown how this decision making tool could help deﬁne environmental tax policies.
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1 Introduction
The management of groundwater is a typical common-pool renewable resource problem where
several users have to share the same resource stock. Not only the volume but also the quality of
the water is a common feature of the stock. Therefore, any attempt to regulate the use of water
has to tackle externalities1 related to both quantity and quality.
A signiﬁcant literature has analyzed the quantitative management of water resources. While
Gisser and Sanchez (1980) [9] argued that policy intervention was not justiﬁed (see Koundouri
2004 [12] for a survey), the consideration of more complicated resource problems and other ex-
ternalities has shown that public intervention may be necessary, e.g., when several resources are
interlinked (Zeitouni and Dinar 1997 [24]), when groundwater has a buﬀer value against surface
water scarcity (Provencher and Burt 1993 [17]), when shocks on the recharge level occur (De
Frutos Cachorro et al. 2014 [5]), or when quality is taken into account (Esteban and Albiac 2011
[8], Roseta Palma 2003 [19]).
Concerning water quality, the problem of nitrate pollution to inland resources has become a
major issue in many places.2 On the one hand, the intensiﬁcation of agriculture has increased
this type of pollution; on the other hand, quality norms have become more stringent because
groundwater resources are often used for drinking water. Many frameworks have been used to
determine optimal water and nitrogen use in agricultural production, including dynamic models
(e.g., Knapp and Schwabe, 2006 [11]; Xepapadeas 1992 [22]; Yadav 1997 [23]). Yet, as Koundouri
2004 [12] points out, these models "generally avoid the relationship between contamination of
groundwater and water-use decisions. The assessment of how much groundwater should be
pumped is absent from these models."
The ﬁrst work that brings together these aspects in a dynamic setting is by Roseta Palma
(2002 [18] and 2003 [19]). Roseta Palma models explicitly the link between water quantity and
water quality distinguishing two eﬀects: the stock dilution eﬀect, which describes the beneﬁcial
impact of water volume on water quality, and the contaminating vector eﬀect in which contam-
inants inﬁltrate more easily into the soil when transported by irrigation water. She also shows
that optimal regulation should address both quantity and quality externalities.
This paper extends the work by Roseta Palma (2002, 2003), constructing a model in which
the water users react to the policies of a water agency. The model describes a group of irrigating
farmers using the same groundwater resource. The fertilizer used by the farmers leaches into
the groundwater and causes nitrate pollution, which is mitigated by the stock dilution eﬀect and
the natural decay rate of the contaminant. Farmers optimize their individual payoﬀs without
considering the impact of their decisions on the stock of water and its quality. To ensure sus-
tainable use of the resource, a water agency is in charge of regulating the quantity and quality of
the groundwater. Regulation takes the form of taxes on water withdrawal and use of fertilizers
and of a subsidy program for the use of nitrogen-ﬁxing plants.3 It is assumed that the regulator
commits to constant policies over one ﬁscal year.4
1A negative (positive) externality is an action that imposes a negative (positive) eﬀect on a third party without
any compensation being considered.
2Another major issue addressed in the literature is the problem of saltwater intrusion in coastal aquifers (see,
e.g., Cummings 1971 [4]; Dinar and Xepapadeas 1998 [6]; Knapp and Baerenklau 2006 [10]; Moreaux and Reynaud
2006 [16]; Tsur and Zemel 2004 [21]; Zeitouni and Dinar 1997 [24]).
3This is the green manure concept: some plants including white mustard (Sinapis alba), vetches (Vicia),
phacelia or rapeseed (Brasica napus) are able to ﬁx nitrogen in the ﬁeld. They are planted after the main harvest,
in the fall and plowed in winter.
4Many articles consider dynamic taxation as a tool for policy intervention (e.g. Burness and Brill 2001 [1]
or Roseta Palma 2003 [19]). However, dynamic taxation requires that the regulator chooses an optimal policy
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The model assumptions concerning the regulatory context are inspired by the current situa-
tion in France. In each major water basin, a water agency is in charge of the water policy and
can levy taxes and provide subsidies. The water agency faces diﬀerent constraints. First, it is
supposed to reach the goals of several European Directives (for instance, Directive 2000/60/EC,
Directive 2006/118/EC, Directive 91/676/EEC). Next, it is endowed with a budget at the start
of the planning horizon and must balance its books at the end of the ﬁscal exercise. There is a
water withdrawal tax (but it is considered to be too low to be an incentive) and several taxes on
polluting inputs (but none apply to nitrate (CAS 2011 [2])). All taxes are constant over the year.
Finally, subsidies were in place to favor the use of plants containing nitrogen-ﬁxing symbiotic
bacteria (but they are not used anymore).5 It is thus interesting to set up a model in which
these diﬀerent constraints and tax and subsidy policies can be introduced in order to evaluate
their amount.
The above model assumptions lead to the study of a non-standard dynamic game with three
state variables and multiple constraints. The model takes into account the interaction between
the farmers and the relation between farmers and the regulatory agency. Results of two scenarios
are contrasted: the laisser-faire scenario, in which the use of water is not regulated and which is
used as a benchmark, and the scenario where the water agency regulates farming activity. The
regulation scenario is constructed as a Stackelberg game, where the water agency is the leader
and the farmers are the followers. The analysis shows that setting realistic tax policies is not
a trivial task for a water agency. The model presented can be considered as a decision making
tool which might help water agencies to deﬁne the level of constant input taxes.
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2, the model, a simpliﬁed agro-economic model
including a groundwater resource, is described. In section 3, the Stackelberg game is presented
and its solution analyzed. In section 4, optimal taxation policies are computed in diﬀerent
examples. The last section contains the conclusion and some suggestions for future research.
2 The Model
2.1 The Farmers
A group of N farmers is considered, growing a single agricultural product on land located above
the same groundwater resource. Time t is continuous and the planning period is [0, T ]. The
agricultural production yi (t) , of farmer i = 1, ...N, at time t ∈ [0, T ] , depends on two inputs, the
quantity of fertilizer spread on cultivated land, fi(t), and the volume of irrigation water, wi(t),
that each farmer pumps from the groundwater resource. The production function, yi(wi(t), fi(t))















In particular, following Roseta Palma (2003) [19], a functional form can be given:







where A,B,E,K,M and G are non- negative parameters.
that changes constantly. Moreover, the regulator would need to be able to commit to a long-term policy. Both
assumptions are not very realistic.
5The water withdrawal tax for irrigation uses other than gravity irrigation is for example of 0.036 Euros per
m3 (Conseil d'État 2010 [3], Sainteny 2012 [20]). The subsidies amounted to 60 Euros per ha in 2003 and 30
Euros per ha in 2006.
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Then, some restrictions on the parameters will be required to satisfy the above conditions:
∂yi
∂wi
= Afi +B −Mwi ≥ 0, ∂
2yi
∂w2i
= −M ≤ 0,
∂2yi
∂wi∂fi
= A ≥ 0, ∂yi
∂fi
= Awi + E −Kfi ≥ 0, ∂
2yi
∂f2i
= −K < 0.
Using the second partial derivatives test, it is easy to verify that for the revenue function to be
concave, the determinant of the Hessian matrix has to be positif, i.e. p2KM − p2A2 > 0 which
implies:6
A2 −KM ≤ 0.
The revenue of farmer i at time t is obtained by simply multiplying production by its price:
pyi (t). The farmers are price- takers and the price pi of the agricultural product remains con-
stant throughout the short planning horizon.
Concerning costs, irrigation cost cw (·) and costs of fertilizer application cf (·) are considered.
















Based on Gisser and Sanchez [9] and its applications (see, e.g., Esteban and Albiac [8]),
irrigation costs are speciﬁed as:
cw(wi (t)) = (Z + CD (t))wi (t) ,
where Z and C are positive parameters and D (t) the distance between the soil surface and the
water-table. The term Zwi represents the cost of distributing water, and CDwi is the water-
pumping cost, which depends on the distance between the topsoil and the water-table and the
pumped volume.
Following Roseta Palma (2003) [19], it is assumed that the cost of fertilizers can be satisfac-
torily approximated by the following linear relationship:
cf (fi (t)) = Lfi (t) ,
where L is a positive parameter.
Concerning public policies, farmers pay a tax τ on the use of polluting fertilizer, and a tax φ




pii(wi(t), fi(t)) dt, (1)
where
pii(wi(t), fi(t)) = piyi(wi(t), fi(t))− cw(D(t), wi(t))− cf (fi(t))− τfi(t)− φwi(t),
and given the functional speciﬁcations:
pii(wi, fi) = p
(







− (Z + CD)wi − Lfi − τfi − φwi.
The following three remarks can be made:
6In some of the following examples, the simplifying assumption A = 0 will be used. In that case, the determi-
nant of the Hessian matrix is positif as by assumption
−KM ≤ 0.
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1. There is no conceptual diﬃculty in extending the model to an oligopolistic setting where
the farmers compete à la Cournot. It is also possible to consider a diﬀerentiated product
(e.g., organic and regular), where the price does not only depend on the quantity of the
product sold on the market, but also on the quality of irrigation water and the quantity of
fertilizer used in farming. Obviously, the more sophisticated the model, the more complex
the computation of the equilibrium policies.
2. Given the short-term planning horizon, farmer i's proﬁt is not discounted over time. In-
cluding a discount factor does not pose any particular diﬃculty.
3. It is assumed that farmers do not take the dynamics of the water resource into account,
except through the water pumping costs. It is possible to consider a case where farmers
react to the evolution of the water-table, which could be observable, or the change in water
quality, which could be measurable.
2.2 The Dynamics
The depth of the aquifer depends on withdrawals by farmers and on natural recharge. r(t)
denotes the mean recharge rate of the groundwater stock. Changes in D are described by the
diﬀerential equation





, D(0) = D0 given, (2)











wi − r, D(0) = D0,
that is the distance to the water table increases with the sum of individual withdrawals and
decreases with the mean annual recharge rate.
The quality of the groundwater depends negatively on the quantity of fertilizer used by each
farmer, and positively on the volume of the stock of water, i.e., the greater the stock of water, the
higher the dilution (mitigation) capacity, and the better the quality. Further, it is assumed that
the water agency can invest in an abatement program to improve the quality of water. Indeed, it
is technically possible to inﬂuence quality by, for example, encouraging the use of nitrogen-ﬁxing
plants. Denote by σ (t) the amount invested in abatement activity at time t. The change in the
quality of the aquifer can then be written as
Q˙ (t) = h
(∑
i
fi(t), σ (t) , D(t)
)
, Q(0) = Q0 given, (3)










With high fertilizer use, the quality degradation is high. Conversely, with high abatement ac-
tivity, quality restoration is high. Likewise, when the distance to the water- table is long, and
the water stock consequently low, degradation of water quality is high. When the distance to
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the water- table is short, and the stock of water consequently large, water quality degradation
is low.





fi (t) + ζσ (t) , Q(0) = Q0,
where ζ and δ are positive scaling parameters. δ is a composite parameter taking into account
the agricultural surface concerned with fertilizer applications, Sa, the dilution eﬀect parameter,
β, and the net natural decay rate, γ, measuring the percentage of nitrate eventually polluting
the aquifer, and is given by: δ = βγSa.
2.3 The Water Agency
Whereas it is easy to deﬁne an objective function for a farmer, deﬁning one for the water agency
is not that straightforward. Ideally, a welfare function should assess the value to society of any
particular government policy. However, writing such a function is a highly complex problem from
both a theoretical and a practical point of view. This paper adopts a pragmatic approach and
assumes that the water agency uses its public policy to achieve (or approach as close as possible)
pre-determined water quality and quantity levels over the planning horizon. More precisely,
the water agency wishes to minimize the distance between the current and desired quality and






α(Q(t)−Qb)2 + (1− α)(D(t)−Db)2
)
dt, (4)
where Db the quantitative norm Qb the qualitative norm and α and (1−α) are positive weights
that measure the importance of the quality and quantity goal, respectively. Typicall, norms may
be thought as being set up in European Policies. Such an objective appears to be in line with the
philosophy of public policy makers who would like to see a clear statement of what a government
program aims to achieve.
To achieve the goals, the water agency can levy constant taxes (or give constant subsidies) on
fertilizer and water use. Moreover, it can invest in a subsidy program for the use of nitrogen-ﬁxing
plants. The agency is indeed endowed with some ﬁnancial resources at the initial instant of time,
and is required to balance its books at the end of the planning horizon. The equilibrium-budget
constraint at T is:









wi(t)− g (σ (t))]dt,
where b0 is the available budget at time 0, and g (σ) is the cost of abatement activities. The
above budget equation is an isoperimetric constraint that can be rewritten in the form of a state
equation as follows:






wi(t)− g (σ (t))] with Y (0) = b0 and Y (T ) = 0, (5)
where Y (t) represents the funds available at time t ∈ [0, T ].
The following clariﬁcations can be made:
1. The tax rates τ and φ do not vary with time and/or with the state of the system during
the planning interval [0, T ]. Such constant tax and subsidy policies were used by Krawczyk
and Zaccour (1996) [13] in a dynamic game in which a local government aims to control
pollution emissions by decentralized agents.
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2. No sign is imposed on the instruments τ and φ. If optimization leads to negative values,
then subsidies should be used rather than taxes.
3. In contrast to taxes, the investment in abatement activity can be a function of time or can
be constant. In the section devoted to illustrations, the case where σ is constant over time
is analyzed.
4. Investment costs g (σ) are assumed to be increasing and convex, with g (0) = 0. In
the section devoted to illustrations, the case of linear investments costs is analyzed, i.e.
g (σ) = sσ, with s being a positive parameter.
5. If the agency was allowed to have a surplus, then the budget constraint, equation (2.3)
would become an inequality, i.e.,










wi(t)− g (σ (t))
)
dt.
To keep it simple, the case where the budget constraint is binding is analyzed.
6. For the sake of simplicity, the case where the water agency is contraint by a minimal proﬁt
for the farmers (Πi(τ∗, φ∗, σ∗) ≥ Π¯i with Π¯i given) is not explicitly considered. Farmers'
proﬁts in the examples are always positive however.
3 Solutions
In the previous section a ﬁnite-horizon diﬀerential game, with N + 1 players (N farmers and a
regulator) was deﬁned (Dockner et al. 2000 [7]). The model involves three state variables: the
quantity D and quality Q of water and the agency's budget, Y . In this section, the solutions to
two scenarios are presented, namely the laisser-faire scenario and the regulation scenario.
3.1 The Laisser-faire Scenario
The case without regulation is given for φ = τ = σ = 0. In this scenario the farmers maximize
their proﬁts individually without taking the dynamics into account, which amounts to optimizing
at each instant of time
pii = p
(







− (Z + CD)wi − Lfi.
First-order optimality conditions are given by
∂pii
∂wi
= p (Afi +B −Mwi)− (Z + CD) = 0,
∂pii
∂fi
= p (Awi + E −Kfi)− Lfi = 0,
which yields
w¯i = w¯ =
A (L− pE) +K (CD + Z − pB)
p (A2 −KM) ,
f¯i = f¯ =
M (L− pE) +A (CD + Z − pB)
p (A2 −KM) .
Consequently, the quantity and quality trajectories are given by
D(t) = e−ρtD0 + Θ′(1− e−ρt),
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p(A2 −MK) > 0, and Θ





This benchmark solution allows to assess the impact of the regulation policy on physical
(quantity and quality) and economic variables (farmers' proﬁts).
3.2 The Regulation Scenario
Like in the benchmark scenario, the control variables of a farmer are water withdrawal wi and
the quantity of fertilizer fi. The water agency chooses the tax rates τ and φ, which can assume
any sign, and the investment in abatement activity σ, which is positive or zero. The game is
played in a Stackelberg mode: the water agency plays the role of the leader and announces its
strategy before the farmers make their decisions. Given the leader's announcement of the tax
policy (τ, φ, σ), the farmers play a Nash game and choose wi and fi.
It is supposed that players employ open-loop strategies, that is, at the initial instant of time,
they decide upon a strategy which depends only on time. This applies in particular to the leader,
the followers playing a static game. It is well known that open-loop Stackelberg equilibria are
in general time inconsistent.7 This means that given the opportunity to revise his strategy at
an intermediate instant of time, the leader would like to choose another strategy than the one
he selected at the initial instant of time. Therefore, an open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium only
makes sense if the leader can credibly precommit to his strategy. In the present game it seems
plausible to assume precommitment on the part of the water agency: in practice a tax scheme
is announced from the outset and sometimes enforced by law.
3.2.1 The Followers' Reaction Functions
To solve for Stackelberg equilibrium, the reaction functions of the followers have to be determined
ﬁrst. Each farmer chooses the levels of inputs, wi(t) and fi(t), that maximize proﬁts, given by
equation (1). Water quality does not appear in the payoﬀ function of a farmer, and hence it is
irrelevant for this agent. Moreover, the budget constraint and the change in the water distance
are supposed to be private information owned by the water agency, i.e., the farmers do not observe














− c′f (fi)− τ = 0. (7)
Equations (6)-(7) are the usual optimality conditions stating that, at the optimum, marginal
revenues from production are equal to marginal costs. In equation (6), marginal revenues are
due to the use of one additional unit of water. Marginal costs are given by marginal costs of
pumping and distributing irrigation water and by the taxes paid per unit of water pumped. In
equation (7), marginal revenues due to the use of one additional unit of fertilizer are equal to
marginal costs of buying fertilizers and the tax paid per unit of fertilizer.
Given the speciﬁcations of the proﬁt function in 2.1, farmer's reaction functions can be
characterized in more detail, expressing his/her choice of input as a function of the tax and
7See, e.g., Martín-Herrán et al.(2005) [15] for examples where open-loop Stackelberg equilibria are time con-
sistent.
8
Author-produced version of the article published in Environmental Science & Policy, 2014, N°44, p. 201-214. 
The original publication is available at http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1462901114001580 
Doi: 10.1016/j.envsci.2014.08.002 
subsidy policy announced. The corresponding reaction functions depend on the distance to
water, D(t) and on both input taxes:
w˜i (τ, φ,D) =
A (L+ τ − pE) +K (CD + Z − pB + φ)
p (A2 −KM) ,
f˜i (τ, φ,D) =
M (L+ τ − pE) +A (CD + Z + φ− pB)
p (A2 −KM) .
Recalling that p
(
A2 −KM) < 0, and that abatement activities and water quality are not
part of the farmers' payoﬀs, the analysis of the above reaction functions allow for the following
comments:











p (A2 −KM) < 0.
So although the farmers are myopic in the sense that they do not account for the dynamics
in their optimization program, their decisions still depend on D because the distance to
the water- table aﬀects their proﬁts. The quality of the groundwater does not appear in
their proﬁt function and therefore does not aﬀect their choice of input levels.
2. The reaction functions are symmetric, that is fi = f and wi = w. This a by-product of
the fact that parameters are the same for all the farmers.
3.2.2 The Leader's Problem
The leader solves a non- standard optimal- control problem because the water agency is assumed
to set constant taxes throughout the planning horizon. He maximizes equation (4) constraint
by the dynamics (2), (3) and (5). Omitting from now on the time argument when no ambiguity
can arise and accounting for the farmers' reactions functions, the dynamics become
Y˙ = τNf˜ (τ, φ,D) + φNw˜ (τ, φ,D)− g(σ), Y (0) = b0, Y (T ) = 0, (8)
D˙ = Nw˜ (τ, φ,D)− r, D(0) = D0, (9)
Q˙ = −δDNf˜ (τ, φ,D) + ζσ Q(0) = Q0 given. (10)
The leader's Hamiltonian reads as follows:
HL
(
D,µD, Q, µQ, Y, µY , τ, φ, σ)
)
= α(Q−Qb)2 + (1− α)(D −Db)2
µD (Nw˜ (τ, φ,D)− r) + µQ
(




τNf˜ (τ, φ,D) + φNw˜ (τ, φ,D)− g(σ)
)
,
where the µD, µQ and µY are adjoint variables appended to the state variables D,Q and Y .
Substituting for w˜ (τ, φ,D) and f˜ (τ, φ,D), this gives:
HL
(
D,µD, Q, µQ, Y, µY (t) , τ, φ, σ)
)
=






A (L+ τ − pE) +K (CD + Z − pB + φ)
p (A2 −KM)
+
(−δDµQ + τµY )NM (L+ τ − pE) +A (CD + Z + φ− pB)
p (A2 −KM) .
9
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Assuming an interior solution, the ﬁrst-order optimality conditions include the three state









(−δDµQ + τµY )A] NC
p (A2 −KM)+
δµQN
M (L+ τ − pE) +A (CD + Z + φ− pB)
p (A2 −KM) , µ
D (T ) = 0,
µ˙Q = −∂HL
∂Q


























K + µY [A (L+ τ − pE) +K (CD + Z − pB)] + (−δDµQ + τµY )A) dt = 0,
∂HL
∂σ








ζµQ − µY g′ (σ) dt = 0 if σ = cte. (17)
In sum, the leader's optimality conditions include 9 equations and same number of unknowns.
Clearly, it is not possible to solve this system analytically and it is therefore necessary to resort to
numerical simulations. However, before moving forward, the following comments can be made:
1. The optimality conditions in (14)-(17) take the form of an integral because of the assump-
tion that the water agency restricts its choice of taxes or abatement to constant ones.
2. As the values of the state variable Y (t) are given at 0 and T , the adjoint variable µY is
free.
3. When considering the abatement as a function of t, the optimality condition in (16) states
that the optimal level of abatement activities is determined following the rule of marginal
cost (given by µY g′ (σ)) equals the marginal gain from quality improvement, i.e., ζµQ).
4. The variation over time in the shadowprice of quality corresponds to the weighted diﬀerence
between the observed quality and its target value at time t (see (12)).
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3.2.3 Optimal tax policies and quantity-quality trajectories
The problem can be solved explicitly for the quantity and quality state variables, which gives:
D(t, φ, τ) = e−ρtD0 + Θ(τ, φ)(1− e−ρt),







p(A2 −MK) > 0, and Θ(τ, φ) = −





Further, without completely solving the ﬁrst- order conditions, the following results can be stated,
showing that the leader's tax policies have the desired impact on quantity and quality.
Proposition 1 The farmers use less water (fertilizer) inputs than in the laisser-faire case when
either the water or the fertilizer inputs are taxed.
Proof. See Appendix(A.1). 
Proposition 2 The use of optimal input taxes leads to both better water quality and a shorter
distance to the water- table, compared to the laisser-faire case, whatever the type of input taxes
used, a water tax or a fertilizer tax.
Proof. See Appendix(A.2). 
Propositions 1 and 2 ensure that the tax policies play as intended. However, they do not
indicate how the optimal policy-mix should be designed, i.e. what the amount of each tax and
subsidy is. It is possible to determine numerically the set of constant policies which allows the
water agency to minimize the (quadratic) distance from the desired quantity and quality goal
and to respect the budget constraint. In the following section, some examples of diﬀerent sets of
such policies are presented.
4 Illustrations
In this section, a few illustrative examples underline the diﬃculties of setting multi-objectif tax
policies. As it is not possible to solve the leader's optimality conditions analytically, numerical
simulations are used. Some of the examples are extreme but provide insight into the equilibrium
behavior of the agency and of the farmers. The model has 21 parameters, namely,
Production function parameters and price : A,B,E,K,M,G, p,
Water pumping cost : Z,C,
Fertilizer cost : L,
Parameters in state equations : D0, Q0, Y0, δ, ζ, r, s,
Target values and weight : Db, Qb, α,
Other parameters : T,N.
The illustration is based on several realistic production and cost functions, taken from the
literature. The values for the production function are taken from Larson et al. 1996 [14] as listed
in Table 1 and illustrated in Figure 1.8
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Figure 1: Production function
Water input is measured in mm/ha, fertilizer in kg/ha. Input costs and the data concerning
the groundwater resource9 are taken from Roseta Palma (2003) [19]. As indicated in Table 2,
the abatement cost parameter, s, is set to 0.05, the abatement eﬃciency ζ is equal to 0.1 and
the composite parameter, δ, is equal to 0.5. Next, a short time horizon of one year is considered
and it is assumed that 10 farmers have access to the aquifer. Note that without using-up the
aquifer the quantity of available water is 550 mm-ha.
As shown in Table 3, in the ﬁrst example the agency has no initial ﬁnancial endowment,
i.e. b0 = 0. Also, at the beginning, the aquifer is completely replenished, i.e. D(0) = 0 and
the quality parameter is zero, i.e. Q(0) = 0. The quantity goal is set to Db = 400, the quality
goal to Qb =-5 000.10 These goals are exogenously given and do not represent optimal values
to be achieved. It can hence be optimal for the water agency to only approach these norms.
Finally, it is assumed that the water agency attaches the same importance to quantity and
quality management, α = 0.5. This ﬁrst set of parameter values is referred to as the baseline
case.
9The recharge rate of r=5.5 million m3 in Roseta Palma corresponds to a recharge in terms of distance to the
water- table of r/(SA)=2.75 m
10Note that a quality goal of -5 000 kg corresponds to a total load of fertilizer of less than 1mg/l in the annual
recharge of 5,5 million m3. In the following, less stringent values are considered. Typically, -250 000 kg correspond
to a total annual load of fertilizer in the recharge of 45 mg/l.
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Table 2: Parameter values 1
Name parameter unit value
Price p e/ kg 0.5
Irrigation costs Z e/mm-ha 0.23
Pumping costs C mm-ha per m 0.003
Fertilizer costs L e/kg 0.4
Recharge rate r mm /year 2 750
Aquifer surface S ha 2 000
Storativity coeﬃcient A 0.1
Agricultural surface Sa ha 1 000
Abatement costs s 0.05
Abatement eﬃciency ζ 0.1
Dilution and pollution parameter δ 0.5
Time horizon T year 1
Number of players N 10
Table 3: Parameter values 2: baseline case
Name parameter unit value
Initial budget Y(0)=b0 e 0
Initial distance to water table D(0) mm 0
Initial quality measure Q(0) kg 0
Quantity target Db mm 400
Quality target Qb kg -5 000
Target weight α 0.5
4.1 Results of the baseline case
In the baseline case, the optimal policy-mix is given by:
φ = 3.01, τ = 4.87, σ = 217502, with µY = 79.04.
The optimal policy consists in taxing water and fertilizer inputs at 3.01 Euros per mm-ha and
4.87 Euros per kg throughout the year. In addition, it is best to invest in green manure, namely
21 752 Euros per farmer and per year.
Table 4 lists some characteristic values for the optimal solution and for the laisser-faire
scenario. In the laisser-faire scenario, farmers lower the water table (i.e. increase the distance
to the water table) and reduce water quality considerably below the desired goals. Farmers use
466 mm-ha of groundwater over the year in the laisser-faire scenario, as opposed to the optimal
policy of 337 mm-ha. Likewise, they use 129 kg/ha of fertilizer, as opposed to the optimal policy
of 14 kg/ha. Hence, farmers use too much inputs with respect to the desired outcome. Not
surprisingly, farmers' gains under the laisser-faire scenario are higher (13 563 Euros per ha) than
with the regulation scenario, where they only earn 13 077 Euros per ha. This means that the
water agency ﬁnances his/her policy by reducing farmers revenues. Finally note that it is optimal
to tax fertilizer inputs more than water inputs. This is due to the very stringent quality goal in
this example.
The evolution of the state and decision variables is illustrated in Figures 2, 3 and 4. The
desired distance to the water- table and the desired water quality level are represented by the
13
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Table 4: Results baseline case
Variable unit With policy Laisser-faire
D(T ) mm 624 1 914
Q(T ) kg -3 181 -867 930∫ T
0 wi mm/ha 337 466∫ T
0 fi kg/ha 14 129∫ T
0 pii e/ha 13 077 13 563
values rounded
dotted lines. The laissez-faire case is represented by the dashed (black) lines. Paths including
the optimal policy are represented by solid (red) lines.
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Figure 2: Budget (left) and distance to the water table (right) in the baseline case
Figure 3: Quality (left) with zoom on optimal policy (right) in the baseline case
Figure 4: Use of inputs: water (left), fertilizer (right) in the baseline case
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4.2 Case with changes in the initial budget
Clearly, the optimal equilibrium solution depends on the budget constraint. In the baseline case,
the initial endowment was set to be zero. Alternatively, it can be assumed the water agency has
an initial endowment, which is the case in most European countries. Consider the cases where
b0 = 50 000, b0 = 100 000 and b0 = 500 000. The optimal solutions are indicated in Table 5.
Table 5: Results when b0 changes
Variable unit b0 = 0∗ b0 = 50 000 b0 = 100 000 b0 = 500 000
D(T ) mm 624 1 038 1 327 2690
Q(T ) kg -3 181 -1 126 929 17 362∫ T
0 wi mm/ha 337 379 408 544∫ T
0 fi kg/ha 14 36 50 109∫ T
0 pii e/ha 13 077 13 178 13 274 13 941
φ e/mm 3.01 1.90 1.10 -2.71
τ e/kg 4.87 4.12 3.68 1.84
σ e/year 217 502 1 173 645 2 126 272 9 745 901
∗ Baseline case. Values rounded.
Having access to an initial endowment, the water agency would set lower taxes and invest
more in green manure. The water quality is generally improved although water and fertilizer
use may increase in comparison with the baseline case. This is due to the possibility of eﬃcient
investment in green manure.11 As water input use increases, the distance to the water table
increases. Hence, increasing the budget leads to better quality performance but worse quantity
performance.
For example the optimal policy for b0 = 100 000 can be depicted in more detail in Table 6
and in Figures 5, 6 and 7. As before, the black dashed lines represent the laisser-faire case and
the red solid lines the optimal policy. Note that the laisser-faire scenario is the same as in the
baseline case.
Table 6: Results when b0 = 100 000
Variable unit With policy Laisser-faire
D(T ) mm 1 327 1 914
Q(T ) kg 929 -867 910∫ T
0 wi mm/ha 408 466∫ T
0 fi kg/ha 50 129∫ T
0 pii e/ha 13 274 13 563
Values rounded.
Comparing the right-hand side of Figures 2 and 5 it is clear that the optimal distance to the
water table increases with an increase in the intial budget. Comparing Figures 3 and 6, it can
be seen that overall quality is higher with a higher initial budget. Finally, comparing Figures 4
and 7, it is obvious that water and fertilizer use have increased in the second example, especially
in the early periods of the year.
11When the initial budget is extremely high (e.g. 500 000 Euros which corresponds to 50 000 Euros per farmer),
it is even optimal to subsidize water use.
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Figure 5: Budget (left) and distance to water table (right) with initial budget of 100 000 Euros
Figure 6: Quality (left) with zoom on optimal policy (right) with initial budget of 100 000 Euros
Figure 7: Input use: water (left), fertilizer (right) with initial budget of 100 000 Euros
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4.3 Case with changes in the quality goal
For the baseline case, a strict quality norm was considered. In the following, cases with a less
stringent quality goal are taken into account, i.e. Qb=-50 000, Qb=-100 000 and Qb=-250 000.
These values correspond to an equivalent of 9 mg/l of recharge in the ﬁrst case, 18 mg/l in the
second, and 45 mg/l in the third case. Optimal solutions are given in Table 7.
Table 7: Results of models with diﬀerent quality norms
Variable unit Qb = −5000∗ Qb =-50 000 Qb = -100 000 Qb =-250 000
D(T ) mm 624 219 301 472
Q(T ) kg -3181 -80 416 -157 625 -389 109∫ T
0 wi mm/ha 337 297 305 322∫ T
0 fi kg/ha 14 128 157 219∫ T
0 pii e/ha 13 077 13 054 13 197 13 650
φ e/mm 3.01 5.46 5.48 5.55
τ e/kg 4.87 -1.66 -3.10 -6.26
σ e/year 217 501 281 750 237 422 83 616
∗ Baseline case. Values rounded.
With a less stringent quality norm, it becomes optimal to subsidize fertilizer use, which will
increase with respect to the baseline case. The quality obtained is less than previously but
this is intended, as the quality norm has changed. To compensate for increased fertlizer use,
investments in green manure increase but water use is also more heavily taxed and consequently
decreases. Hence the quality obtained is less important but the quantity obtained is better than
in the previous example.
It is interesting to compare the laisser-faire and the optimal solution of the particular case
where Qb = −100000. As shown in Table 8, optimal fertilizer use now increases to 157 kg per
ha which even exceeds the laisser-faire case. On the other hand, overall water use decreased to
305 mm per ha, still below the laisser-faire level. The optimal evolution of the state and decision
variables is shown in ﬁgures 8, 9 and 10.
Table 8: Results with quality norm Qb =-100 000
Variable unit Qb = -100 000 Laisser-faire
D(T ) mm 301 1914
Q(T ) kg -157 625 -867 910∫ T
0 wi mm/ha 305 466∫ T
0 fi kg/ha 157 129∫ T
0 pii e/ha 13 197 13 563
Values rounded.
Comparing the right-hand-side of Figures 2 and 8, it is clear that the optimal distance to the
water- table decreases when the quality norm is less stringent. The quality goal can more easily
be reached (see Figure 9) which helps to achieve the quantity goal. Comparing ﬁgures 4 and 10
shows that water use decreases in the early periods of the year. Moreover, fertilizer use increases
not only in the early periods of the year but also during the later periods of the year, when it
even exceeds the laisser-faire level.
18
Author-produced version of the article published in Environmental Science & Policy, 2014, N°44, p. 201-214. 
The original publication is available at http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1462901114001580 
Doi: 10.1016/j.envsci.2014.08.002 
Figure 8: Budget (left) and distance to the water table (right) with quality norm Qb = -100 000
Figure 9: Quality (left) with zoom on optimal policy (right) with quality norm Qb = -100 000
Figure 10: Input use: water (left), fertilizer (right) with quality norm Qb = -100 000
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4.4 Concluding Remarks on the Illustration
First note that a higher budget leads to higher investment in green manure but also allows a
greater fertilizer use. The quality goal is improved, although fertilizer use has increased, because
the green manure investment is eﬃcient. However, greater fertlizer use leads to a concomittant
increase in water inputs and consequently, the quantity goal is less well respected.
On the other hand, a less stringent quality norm leads to subsidies on fertilizer inputs which are
ﬁnanced by taxes on water use. Fertilizer use increases but water use decreases and consequently,
the quantity goal is more easily reached, because the quality goal is less strict.
In some examples, optimal quantity or quality trajectories "overshoot" the desired policy goal.
This is due to two facts: ﬁrst, the nature of the optimization problem, which contains multiple
constraints, makes it impossible to reach all the "desired" situations at the same time. Second,
the objective of minimizing the quadratic distance to the desired goals allows itself for some
overshooting. This can be justiﬁed if exogenous norms do not indicate exact values but represent
a desirable range to be reached over one year. The main conclusion from the above examples is
that it is not trivial to set second best policies in an optimal manner. The model can help to set
optimal amounts of investment and input taxes, as shown above.
5 Concluding Remarks
A model of groundwater management was set up in which a group of farmers overexploit the
water stock and causes excessive pollution, by using too much irrigation water and fertilizer.
Considering the fact that a dynamic taxation policy is not easy to implement for a water agency,
but that commitment to a constant policy over one ﬁscal year was not a major problem for the
agency, the analysis searches a set of constant policies that allows the regulator to bring the water
resource close to the desired quantity and quality goals. To identify the optimal policy-mix, a
Stackelberg game was constructed. Analytical results show that, in addition to the usual ﬁrst
order conditions, some special conditions are needed to account for the fact that in practice, the
water agency can only impose constant policies. Analytical results also show how the farmers'
choice of inputs and the water agency's optimal policy choice depend on the other parameters
of the model. Model simulations show that the optimal policy-mix is non-trivial, depending on
the context in which the water agency takes its decisions, namely whether quantity and quality
goals are far from the current state and whether the budget constraint is strong or not.
The analysis can be extended in diﬀerent directions. First, it would be interesting to compare
the constant policies derived here with time-varying policies. The diﬀerence would provide a
measure of the cost of simplicity or implementability. Second, the solution of this model could be
compared to a socially optimal solution where the leader optimizes joint welfare but implements
constant policies. These extensions are clearly of intellectual interest. Solving the resulting
games and implementing the equilibrium results remain a major challenge. More generally, the
model could be extended to consider several resources or more complex hydro-geological systems.
One condition for such extension is that the researcher be able to describe the dynamics of the
resource stock. Likewise, the model could be extended to consider users with more divergent
characteristics, for example farmers with ﬁeld crops on the one hand and fruit and vegetable
producers on the other hand. Finally, it would be possible to consider a central government that
regulates several diﬀerent resource systems at a time, being subject to a single budget constraint.
It would then be possible to apply the decision making tool at a national level. However, the
link between groundwater use and pollution still needs to be locally determined and input taxes
must be directed towards the polluters, in order to be eﬃcient policies.
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Solving D˙ = Nw˜ − r, gives:
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1− e−ρt] < 0.
Also, remember that independently of wheather σ a function of t or a constant











) = sign(−1) < 0.
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